Wireless sensor networks (WSN) have become increasingly popular in monitoring environments such as: disaster relief operations, seismic data collection, monitoring wildlife and military intelligence. The sensor typically consists of small, inexpensive, battery-powered sensing devices fitted with wireless transmitters, which can be spatially scattered to form an ad hoc hierarchically structured network. Recently, the global positioning system (GPS) facilities were embedded into the sensor node architecture to identify its location within the operating environment. This mechanism may be exploited to extend the WSN's applications. To face with the security requirements and challenges in hierarchical WSNs, we propose a dynamic location-aware key management scheme based on the bivariate polynomial key pre-distribution, where the aggregation cluster nodes can easily find their best routing path to the base station, by containing the energy consumption, storage and computation demands in both the cluster nodes and the sensor nodes. This scheme is robust from the security point of view and able to work efficiently, despite the highly constrained nature of sensor nodes.
Introduction
WSNs have been deployed in different environments, including disaster relief operations, seismic data collection, monitoring wildlife and battlefield management/military intelligence. Sensors can be installed in a variety of environments and usually establish a wireless network infrastructure to communicate and exchange information into their operating area. The sensor node is characterized by limited computing power and hence has a low price. Due to their small size, sensors can be spatially scattered to form an ad hoc network. Therefore, WSNs require an appropriate cryptosystem to ensure secure communication and mutual trust between their component nodes. In this scenario, key management becomes an issue of paramount importance since most of the encryption-related primitives require the use and distribution of keys in their operations. The high computational cost of the strongest available techniques (e.g., Diffie-Hellman key management [1] or Rivest Shamir Adleman encryption [2] ) make most of them not suitable for use in a WSN, characterized by "hardware-constrained" devices, so that the use of "plain" symmetric cryptography becomes an unavoidable choice. Furthermore, also the key dimension and the number of potentially pre-storable keys may become a significant obstacle to the deployment of strong cryptographic techniques on these tiny devices due to their limited amount of available memory. The last important issue is energy consumption, which is widely known to increase proportionally to the computing efforts [12] , such as the ones required by strong cryptosystems. In 2011, Xia et al. [3] focused on addressing the energy efficiency problem in sensor networks. Accordingly, the use of efficient, lightweight and robust symmetric encryption schemes, together with the associated management protocols, needed to establish and distribute the corresponding keys among the network nodes, assumes a fundamental importance in WSN security. The simplest WSN architectures are based on a strongly meshed, flat interconnection scheme, which is known to exhibit a limited scalability when the number of nodes grows. However, in recent years, starting from the consideration that, in most applications, the connectivity between all the sensors is not necessary, more cost and performance-effective hierarchical schemes [4] are emerging. These schemes, structured according to a multi-tier hierarchical model, allow some "cluster" nodes, characterized by a more powerful hardware equipment (storage and computing capacity, antenna power, battery duration, etc.) to aggregate and pre-process the data incoming from the inexpensive sensor nodes, by reducing the traffic load, the energy consumption as long as the number of hops needed to communicate with the base station (BS), that is in charge for the overall WSN's operations. The most common hierarchical model is two-tier, providing two classes of sensors (basic sensors and cluster aggregators), apart from the BSs. To cope with this scenario several hierarchical key management and distribution reference schemes have been developed. In detail, Chan, Perrig and Song proposed a Random Key Pre-distribution scheme (RKP) [5] , where each node randomly picks m keys from a large key pool, such that any twosensor nodes will share at least one common key with a certain probability. The PIKE scheme [6] addressed the problem of high-density deployment requirements in RKP. Cheng and Agrawal proposed an improved key distribution mechanism known as IKDM [7] using the polynomial keys and easily generating the session keys between the sensor and the cluster nodes.
The cluster nodes use the authentication key to authenticate the sensor nodes. The concept of the large-scale network model underlying IKDM is helpful for us to design our key management scheme. However, the IKDM incurs in high computation cost between the cluster nodes. In this work, we leveraged on the dynamic key management mechanism (KDM) proposed in [8] and on the bivariate polynomial key scheme presented in [7] to establish the session keys and achieve mutual authentication between nodes. The resulting WSN security framework not only can solve the RKP defects (a small number of compromised nodes may expose a large fraction of common keys between the non-compromised nodes [5] ), but also successfully copes with the PIKE need to use a lot of sensor memory, and reduces the computation cost of the IKDM. In addition, we also introduced in the resulting key management scheme several location-based considerations and mechanisms [9, 10] involving the GPS (Global Positioning system) to identify, in presence of GPS-equipped nodes, the nearest sensors and hence the best key path to the BS on each distribution step. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some background prerequisites. Section 3 presents our scheme, analyzed in Section 4. Finally, conclusions are presented in Section 5.
Backgrounds

Polynomial Key pre-Distribution Schemes
Polynomial key pre-distribution schemes use the polynomial mathematics in order to generate key pool and perform key assignment among the involved parties. A key distribution server (KDS), performs off-line distribution of several polynomial shares of degree k to a set of nodes so that any k users are able to calculate a common key that can be used in their communications without any kind of interaction. By evaluating its own stored polynomials with the identifiers (ID) of the other (k − 1) parties, each node can determine a common key, independently shared with the other nodes. Blundo et al. [11] proposed a bivariate polynomial ) ,
( y x f that can be used to compute the key; the parameters ) , ( y x were defined as the unique ID between the sensors x and y respectively. The polynomial is defined as:
where the coefficients ij a (0 ≤ i , j ≤ k) are randomly chosen from a finite Galois field GF(Q); Q is a prime number that is large enough to accommodate a cryptographic key. The bivariate polynomial has a symmetric property like:
In our specific WSN environment each sensor has a unique ID and, as the first step of network deployment, the KDS first initializes the sensors by giving to each sensor p a polynomial share
In other words, each sensor node p stores a number of k coefficients j
where p is the node ID of the sensor, and j g is the coefficient of j y in the polynomial ) , ( y p f .
Properties of Polynomial Key pre-Distribution Scheme
The main strength of the bivariate polynomial key pre-distribution scheme is that there is no overhead during the node-to-node pairwise key establishment activity. The main known drawback, on the other hand, is the "K-security" property: a k-degree scheme is only robust against coalitions of up to k compromised nodes [7] . Until the number of compromised nodes is kept lower than k, even if all the compromised nodes share their secret data, the unknown coefficients of the polynomial cannot be calculated. However, when more than k nodes are compromised, the coefficients can be determined from the combination of all the available data.
The Proposed Scheme
We combine the effectiveness of bivariate polynomial key management schemes with the location based ones. By assuming that the sensor nodes' position can be dynamically determined via GPS, our scheme is also able to leverage on the sensor location information to improve its overall performance, with respect to traditional location-oblivious schemes. It allows data aggregation in a fewer number of places, located on better paths to the BS, by simultaneously achieving the same connectivity and security degree, with a lower number of keys to be stored in each sensor node. The operating phases of the integrated framework are described in the following.
Using Bivariate Polynomial to Design a Dynamic Key Management Scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks
Notation
The following notation is used in the following. 
Initialization Phase
In this phase, the BS pre-distributes the polynomial scheme parameters to both the sensor nodes and cluster nodes.
Step 1: The BS selects a random number i a and computes the hash chain:
Step 2: The BS selects a random number i b and builds the hash chain as:
Then the BS stores )) , ( ),..., , ( ), , ((
in the dynamic key list list CNKEY of the n cluster nodes,
The BS randomly selects two polynomials from the k ones for n cluster nodes, and then stores the bivariate polynomial on these nodes:
The BS selects a nonce i CN N , and then stores
Location-based Routing Plan Determination
In this phase, the cluster nodes can establish the best route on the basis of the received broadcast location message in a monitoring area.
Step 1: After the Initialization phase, the sensors and cluster nodes have stored the operating parameters and then distributed the associated messages within their operating environment.
Step 2: The BS broadcasts each sensor network start message start msg to the cluster nodes.
Step 3: Upon receiving the start message, the cluster node (equipped with a GPS receiver) broadcasts the message location msg concerning its location to the neighbor cluster nodes.
Step 4: After receiving the message location msg , the cluster nodes know the location of the source neighbor cluster so that it can transmit the monitor data to the cluster node that is nearest to the BS. For example, in Figure 1 
On the basis of the shortest distance between the cluster node and the BS, each cluster node will establish the best routing path. In Figure 2 , the cluster node 9 R can determine that the neighbor cluster node on the best path is 5 R , and the cluster node 5 R and 1 R can determine the 1 R and BS , respectively. The best path for the cluster node 9 R can be established as follows:
. In the same way, the cluster node 3 R can determine the best path: 
Fig. 1. Each cluster node broadcasts its location to its neighbor cluster nodes
Establishing the Polynomial Session Key Phase
The cluster nodes can use the bivariate polynomial to establish the pairwise session keys along the previously determined multi-hop paths. 
Cluster Node Requests Session Key Phase
Each cluster node, when collecting the monitoring data, receives the associated messages from its p sensor nodes, and then decrypts them properly. In order to do this, the cluster node needs to request the session key to the BS. The session key request scenario is shown in Figure 3 . , (
The sensor node computes the finish message key
Then the sensor node uses the dynamic session key
The sensor node then sends ( i SN ID , 1 C ) to the cluster node.
Step 2: The cluster node Chin-Ling Chen et al.
Authentication Phase
In this phase, the BS authenticates the cluster nodes. Moreover, the cluster node can also authenticate the BS accordingly. The overview of the authentication phase is shown in Figure 4 .
Step 1: Once receiving the message ) , 
Dynamic Key Management Phase
The cluster node decrypts the message from the members, collects the monitor data, and sends it to the BS. When the finish message is sent out, the BS and all the sensors update the dynamic key. The overview of the dynamic key management phase is shown in Figure 5 .
Step 1: After the authentication, the cluster node 
After that, the cluster node ) where ( ), , ( 
Step 3: The sensor node i SN decrypts 10 C and gets the message 
Analysis and Discussion
Sensor Network Resilience
Since the cluster nodes have the GPS location capability, when the BS sends the start message to the cluster node, the cluster node can find its location, broadcasts the location message to the neighbor cluster nodes and finds the nearest cluster node of the BS. Therefore, if the cluster nodes are compromised or the sensors are at low-energy, the cluster node broadcasts to the new neighbor cluster nodes that are nearest to the BS. In this way, our scheme achieves the network resilience.
Resistance to Sensor Node Capture Attack
Node capture attack is a serious threat in WSNs deployed in hostile environments. Due to their hardware limitations the nodes usually are not tamper-resistant and hence any adversary that captures a sensor can easily extract its stored secret data to break the underlying security scheme. In our scheme, because the coefficients ij a (0 ≤ i , j ≤ k) are randomly chosen from a finite GF(Q), where Q is a prime number that is large enough to accommodate a cryptographic key, each cluster node pair has a unique pairwise session key If we use a k-degree bivariate polynomial our scheme is guaranteed to be (k + 1)-secure. That is, no less than (k + 1) nodes holding polynomial shares have to be captured in order to reconstruct it.
Mutual Authentication
We can consider two fundamental cases: 
Dynamic Key Management
In the dynamic key management phase, the session keys of the sensor and cluster nodes are generated as follows: Our scheme can solve the replay problem in random pairwise keys predistribution. It only needs two pre-stored parameters to produce the session key by using the hash function. When the information transmission is finished, the cluster and the sensor nodes should update the session key and prevent the replay attack after each session.
Discussion
The proposed scheme supports mutual authentication and fully dynamic key agreement. It is worth mentioning that it embeds the polynomial key function and the GPS location capability in cluster nodes. Each cluster node can leverage on GPS information to find out its best path to the BS, and the polynomial key function can be easily used to create the cluster node session keys j i CN CN K − necessary for encrypted communications between adjacent cluster node pairs (i, j) along this path. If any of these cluster node gets corrupted, the other ones can use the broadcast message start msg to find out their new best path to the BS. As Table 1 shows that our scheme is superior to other related works. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a dynamic key management scheme. Our scheme can achieve the following goals:
(1) We provide a dynamic key management to prevent the replay attack.
(2) We use the GPS technology to find the nearest node of the BS to the neighbor cluster nodes. (3) We proposed a nonce-based mechanism to complete the mutual authentication between the BS and cluster nodes. It can enhance the information security. (4) We coped with the storage and energy consumption limitations and reduced the computation cost of the sensors.
In the future, we envision that our scheme could be extended to apply polynomial key techniques in different WSNs for more efficient transmission combined with energy control mechanism or for implementing alternate key management strategies.
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